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Introduction
The importance of sustainable public finances has received increasing attention particularly in the context and following the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis. From a fiscal perspective, maintaining a stable long-term relationship between expenditures and revenues is one of the key requirements for a stable macroeconomic environment and a sustainable economy. Therefore, our purpose is to find out whether fiscal imbalances in a number of OECD countries need to be curtailed before they become economically unsustainable, leading to insolvency situations.
Sustainable fiscal policies can be continued indefinitely without any change in the policy stance, and when the intertemporal government budget constraint holds in present value terms. 1 Conversely, if budgetary imbalances prevail, economic policies at both macro and microeconomic levels will quickly become unsupportable and changes would be required. If such a phenomenon occurs, then fiscal imbalances would imply a need for larger and more painful adjustments for the economy. Given the detrimental impact of persistent deficits, practices on debt sustainability and appropriate fiscal policies are extremely important. For instance, Blanchard et al. (1990) present as a definition of a sustainable fiscal policy one that allows, in the short-term, that the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to its original level after some excessive variation.
There has been a substantial volume of empirical studies focusing on fiscal sustainability, tackling explicit government liabilities, looking notably at the US and European cases (see, Hamilton and Flavin, 1986 thresholds, also in a fiscal reaction approach. 2 
_____________________________
1 Analysis on fiscal sustainability has focused on both the univariate properties of government debt (e.g. Hamilton and Flavin, 1986 ) and on the long-run relationship between government revenues and expenditures (e.g. Hakkio and Rush, 1991) . 2 Regarding the specification of fiscal reaction functions, not the main purpose of the current paper, Afonso and Jalles (2011b) have tackled the issue also in a multi-country framework.
On the other hand, Bohn (2007) provides a substantial challenge to the time series literature on fiscal policy. Specifically, Bohn suggested that rejections of stationarity-based sustainability tests are invalid because in an infinite sample, any order of integration of debt is consistent with the transversality condition which implies that the intertemporal budget constraint may be satisfied even if these particular time series tests are not. Instead, Bohn (2007) emphasizes whether a country's primary balance responds positively to debt as an indicator of sustainability.
As in Bohn (1998) , this depends upon the assumption that the series are stationary, or when they are nonstationary, for them to be related in a statistical sense, they must be of the same order of integration and the primary balance and government debt must be cointegrated.
Additionally, another strand of the literature, as for example, , estimate fiscal reaction functions, for the assessment of whether governments behave in a Ricardian. In the same vein, other papers study theoretical thresholds or limits to assess when fiscal policies need to be changed (see, Richter, 2011) . As in other related studies, this is usually done for the US. However, this is not the main objective of our study, since we derive our cointegration relationships directly from the intertemporal government budget constraint.
Still, some of the results those studies can indirectly be read as providing also information on the sustainability of public finances.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate and draw some policy lessons on the sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 18 OECD countries. Besides answering this policy question, we are also interested, among other things, in ascertaining the causal direction between government expenditures and revenues. The causal direction between the two budgetary variables may provide useful insights into how policy makers can manage budget deficits in the future. In our empirical approach we perform a systematic analysis of the stationarity properties of the first-differenced stock of government debt as well as, on the one hand, the relation between government revenues and expenditures and, on the other hand, the relation between primary balances and debt, in line with Bohn (1998) . These approaches provide us with an indirect test on the solvency of public finances in these countries. We conduct this analysis on a country-by-country basis, by means of several time series techniques, for robustness purposes, as well as for the panel as a whole, using annual data over the period 1970-2010.
Thus, our contributions are as follows: i) we combine both individual-country analysis by means of (recent) time-series techniques with panel data approaches for completeness and robustness purposes; ii) we take a longer time span and make use of uniform and comparable data for 18 OECD countries; iii) we identified structural breaks in the series and in the cointegration relations; iv) and we explore three different channels to evaluate fiscal sustainability as put forward in theoretical terms, that is, by looking at the first-differenced debt ratios, the relationship between government revenues and expenditures and, finally, the relationship between (lagged) public debt and primary balances.
Briefly, our results show that the first-differenced debt series for most countries is nonstationarity suggesting that the solvency condition would not be satisfied. Moreover, evidence suggests the existence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries between revenues and expenditures. However, the overall test results allow the rejection of the cointegration hypothesis in both relationships under scrutiny. In other words, for the period 1970-2010, government expenditures, in half of the countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than government revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal sustainability.
On the other hand, the cointegrating coefficients for the revenues-expenditures relationship are positive (but less than one) and statistically significant, meaning that for each percentage point of GDP increase in public expenditures, revenues increase by less than one percentage point of GDP. In terms of causality, our evidence suggests stronger effects running from revenues to expenditures and most countries are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned expenditures. We find Granger-causality from government debt to the primary balance, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime. Finally, panel data analysis corroborates time-series findings and even though we find that long-run causality seems to run from lagged debt to the primary balance, on average the marginal longrun impact is zero. All in all, we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable for most countries in our sample.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the underlying theoretical framework which serves as the basis for the empirical strategy that follows. Section 3 presents the time-series and panel data econometric methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses our main results and findings. The last section concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Regarding the sustainability of fiscal policy the empirical literature usually tests for the possibility of both public expenditures and government revenues continuing their historical growth patterns. In principle, any value for the budget deficit would be possible if the government could raise its liabilities without limit, which is naturally impossible since the government is faced with the present value of its own budget constraint.
The government budget constraint can be used to derive the present value of the budget constraint. The flow budget constraint is written as:
where: G -government expenditures, excluding interest payments; R -government revenues; B -public debt; r -real interest rate.
Rewriting equation (1) for the subsequent periods, and recursively solving leads to the intertemporal budget constraint:
When the second term in the right-hand side of (2) is zero, the present value of the existing stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of future primary surpluses. However, it is more useful to make several algebraic modifications to equation (1) to obtain an appropriate specification for the empirical tests. Assuming that the real interest rate is stationary, with mean r, and defining:
we obtain the following so-called Present Value Borrowing Constraint (PVBC):
A sustainable fiscal policy should ensure that the present value of the stock of public debt, the second term of the right-hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity, constraining the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate, imposing the absence of Ponzi games. Therefore, the government needs to achieve future primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the current value of the stock of public debt.
It is also possible to derive the solvency condition, with all the variables defined as a percentage of GDP. Thus, the PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP, with y being the GDP real growth rate, is written as:
Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with mean r, and considering also constant real growth, the budget constraint is then given by: in order to bound public debt growth. This yields the familiar result that fiscal policy will be sustainable if the present value of the future stream of primary surpluses, as a percentage of GDP, matches the "inherited" stock of government debt.
Recalling the PVBC, equation (4), it is possible to present analytically two complementary definitions of sustainability that set the background for empirical testing: 3 i) The value of public current debt must be equal to the sum of future primary surpluses:
ii) The present value of public debt must approach zero in infinity:
In order to test empirically the absence of Ponzi games, one can test the stationarity of the first difference of the stock of public debt ( t B  ) and the cointegration between primary balance (s) and the (lagged) stock of the public debt, in line with Bohn (2007) , using the following cointegration regression:
. This, so called, "backward-looking" approach implies that an increase in the previous level of debt would result in a larger primary balance monetary policy, being the determination of prices its nominal anchor; "passive" fiscal policy with the budget balance path being endogenous) and a non-Ricardian or Fiscal-dominant regime (hereafter FD) (which allows fiscal policy to set primary balances -"active" -and to follow an arbitrary process, not necessarily compatible with solvency). These concepts will be further addressed when discussing our empirical results in Section 4.
It is also possible to assess fiscal policy sustainability through cointegration between government revenues and expenditures. The implicit hypothesis concerning the real interest rate, _____________________________ 3 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) first used these procedures. See also Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991 
and with the no-Ponzi game condition, t GG and t R must be co-integrated variables of order one for their first differences to be stationary.
Therefore the procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget constraint involves testing the following cointegration regression:
. If the null of no co-integration is rejected, the residual t u must be stationary, and should not display a unit root. Hakkio and Rush (1991) demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary variables in levels, the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget constraint to be obeyed.
However, when revenues and expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP or in per capita terms, it is necessary to have b = 1 in order for the trajectory of the debt to GDP not to diverge in an infinite horizon. 
Econometric Methodology

Cointegration, Stability and Causality
Consider the following two cointegrating-relationship regressions, as identified in Section 2:
_____________________________ 5 The critical values in Zivot and Andrews (1992) are different to the critical values in Perron (1989) . The difference is due to the fact that the selection of the time of the break is treated as the outcome of an estimation procedure, rather than predetermined exogenously. 6 For more detailed discussion of these tests that allow for endogenously determined breaks, the reader should refer to the original references. 7 We thank Pierre Perron and Tomoyoshi Yabu for providing their GAUSS code. (10): if a positive and significant coefficient is to be found that would be a sufficient condition for solvency, indicating that the government satisfies its present-value budget constraint. A problem with such finding is that it is compatible with both the MD and FD regimes. 9 Hence, we will combine cointegration with Granger-causality analysis.
We test for cointegrating (long-run) relations between government revenues and expenditures (primary balance and government debt) using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) methodology.
This approach estimates the long-run attracting set in a VAR context that incorporates both the short-and long-run dynamics of the various models.
However, and as in the case of unit roots, a test for co-integration that does not take into account possible breaks in the long-run relationship will have lower power. The test will tend to under-reject the null of no co-integration if there is a co-integration relationship that has changed at some time during the sample period. Therefore, to further evaluate the previous results, one should also entertain the possibility that the series are co-integrated but that the linear combination has shifted at an unknown point in the data sample, in other words, that there might be a relevant break date. Following Gregory and Hansen (1996) , the hypothesis of a structural shift in the co-integration relationships is then studied.
10
In order to estimate the parameter  in both equations (10) and (11) we resort to the method of Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993) , following the methodology proposed by Shin (1994) . This method has the advantage of providing a robust _____________________________ 8 To test for cointegration all variables must be integrated of the same order. 9 In a MD regime we would observe that an increase in previous' period debt would lead to a larger primary balancel ex-post. Equivalently, in a FD regime, a derease in the expected primary balance would lead to a decrease in the current debt ratio, through a price increase. 10 The authors have extended the Engle-Granger model to allow for a single break in the co-integration relationship. We thank Bruce Hansen for making the GAUSS routine available. Toda and Phillips (1994) . Also, it is well documented that the exclusion of relevant variables induces spurious significance and inefficient estimates. In dealing with these problems and for robustness purposes, we employ Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lutkepohl (1996) approach for Granger causality. They suggest a technique that is applicable irrespective of the integration and cointegration properties of the system. The method involves using a Modified Wald statistic for testing the significance of the parameters of a VAR(s) model (where s is the lag length in the system).
11
We follow Rambaldi and Doran (1996) in formulating these tests. Define max d as the maximum order of integration in the system, a VAR(
) has to be estimated to use the Modified Wald test for linear restrictions on the parameters of a VAR(k) which has an asymptotic 2  distribution. 12 In our case, we will run a 2 variables' VAR (for i) government . For our VAR(3) we estimate the following system of equations: 
The above system of equations is estimated via the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
There are four main hypotheses with regard to the causal nexus of government revenues and expenditures:
1. One way causation from expenditures to revenues. This suggests that the government adjusts revenues to the level of the planned expenditures (see Barro, 1979 ).
2. One way causation from revenues to expenditures. Following this hypothesis, the authorities adjust their expenditures to the level of the revenue so that control over revenues leads to limited growth in the public sector (Friedman, 1978 ).
3. Bidirectional causality (fiscal synchronization). This hypothesis is based on the equivalence of marginal cost and marginal revenue that the utility-maximizing suppliers and demanders of the public services make. That is, the fiscal authorities made simultaneous decisions on expenditures and revenues. Hence, the two variables mutually reinforce each other. This is the classical view of public finance (Musgrave, 1966 ).
4. No causality. The authorities can set the level of expenditures and revenues by rule of thumb. This phenomenon reflects the institutional separation of allocation and taxation functions of the government (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992 ). This view is also consistent with no cointegration and a potential sustainability problem.
It is worth noting that causality per se has implications only for the dynamics of the fiscal adjustments process and not for the sustainability condition. The latter depends on the existence of the condition outlined earlier. Since causality tests do give estimates of the authorities' reactions to the past fiscal imbalances, it would provide a useful indicator of how the authorities may respond to the imbalances in the future.
Panel Data
Panel Unit Roots
Given the notoriously low power of individual country-by-country tests for unit roots and cointegration, it may be preferable to pool the time series of interest and conduct panel analysis.
We implement three different types of panel unit root tests: two first generation tests, namely the 
Panel Cointegration and Panel Causality
We implement the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (2004) . This is a residual- Assuming that government revenues and expenditures (government debt and primary balance) are cointegrated (to be confirmed in Section 5), one thus need to estimate the cointegrating coefficients to investigate the long-run relationship between them. We apply the between-dimension panel fully modified OLS (FMOLS) (Pedroni, 2000 (Pedroni, , 2001 . The rationale _____________________________ 13 Pedroni (1999) shows that the panel ADF and group ADF tests have better small-smaple properties than the other tests, hence they are more reliable (Lee et al., 2008) .
for using FMOLS is that in the presence of unit root variables, the effect of superconsistency may not dominate the endogeneity effect of the regressors if OLS is employed (Lee et al., 2008) . Pedroni (2000) showed that the FMOLS approach can be used to draw an inference about cointegration with heterogeneous dynamics. FMOLS takes care of endogeneity problem and provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients, which can be interpreted as long-run elasticities.
Individual estimates and standard errors for 0 :
in (10) and (11) 
where
is the disequilibrium term and it represents how far our variables are from the equilibrium relationship, and the error correction mechanism estimates how this disequilibrium causes the variables to adjust towards equilibrium in order to keep the long-run relationship intact. The Granger representation theorem implies that at least one of the 
interpreted as a test of the sign of the long-run effect of shocks or innovations to government expenditures on revenues. In the next Section we present and discuss our main findings. _____________________________ 14 We thank Peter Pedroni for providing his RATS code.
Empirical Analysis
Stylised Facts and Data Overview
Most _____________________________ 15 See Harvey (1989 Harvey ( , 1991 for details. This class of models is preferred to other trend-cycle filters, as the HP. This one, which has been employed widely in the recent RBC literature, is not considered appropriate as it explicitly neglets low frequency swings by assumption and Harvey and Jaeger (1993) show that the HP filter may create spurious cycles and other distortions. 16 Upon careful examination of several descriptive statistics, a likely specification for the trend and the cycle has been estimated. For reasons of parsimony, basic diagnostic, goodness-of-fit statistics and estimated variances for the hyperparameters for different structural time series models are available upon request. All these models assumed the presence of a trend, one cycle and an irregular component. Three STMs were considered: the first statistical specification assumed that the trend component follows a random walk with drift, with a deterministic slope; the second introduced a somewhat smoother trend with a deterministic level and a stochastic slope; finally, we had a local linear trend model, which stipulates the level and slope to be stochastic. The best model was selected based, primarily, on both AIC and BIC Information Criteria (amongst others) and this corresponds to the version(s) plotted in Figure 3 . 
Country Analysis
The fact that our series are in ratio to GDP does not rule them out being integrated processes (see, Ahmed and Yoo, 1989) . Hence, we now focus on fiscal policy sustainability for each of the 18 countries by means of several unit root tests in an attempt to validate the sufficient sustainability condition using the stock of government debt. Table 1 [ Table 1 .a]
The previous set of results assumes that there is no structural break in the government debt series. However, this might not be the case in some countries -for example, in periods of war or important economic downturns. In the presence of structural changes in the trend function, ADF and PP tests that do not take into account the break in the series have low power, and are biased toward the non-rejection of a unit root. Therefore, in Table 1 _____________________________ 17 One should also note that the number of observations used is only 41 at most, and the accuracy problems of unitroot tests with small samples are well known. Afonso and Jalles (2011a) make use of the longer time series debt data going back to the late 19 th century to study fiscal sustainability, and such considerations do not apply. 18 Several studies detect in such periods expansionary fiscal consolidation episodes (see, Afonso, 2010).
[ Table 1 .b] Stationarity aside, we now address the cointegration issue, given by (10) and (11), by analysing the relationship between revenues and expenditures and between the primary balance and (lagged) debt. Table 2 .a presents the results for the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test for the former case. We find evidence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries (Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Japan and Netherlands); whereas in Table 2 .b (for the latter case), we find evidence of cointegration in 8 countries (Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). Therefore, one would not reject the idea that public finances have been less unsustainable in those countries. 19 Moreover, in these cases results from the Hansen-stability test did not reject the null hypothesis that the series are cointegrated at conventional levels (with p-values larger than 20%). Overall, test results allow the rejection of the cointegration hypothesis for the majority of the countries in both relationships under scrutiny.
[ Table 2 .a, 2.b]
As previously discussed in Section 3.1.1 we further test the hypothesis of a structural shift in the cointegration relationship for all countries in our sample, by using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) procedure. Table 3 presents our results. After taking into account the possibility of breaks in the series, we get for the revenues-expenditure relationship, rejections of the null of no cointegration in 9 countries for the ADF* statistic (relatively in line with previous findings); 20 similarly for the balance-(lagged) debt relationship, we reject the null in only 4 countries. In other words, for the period 1970-2010, government expenditures, in half of the countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than public revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability.
[ Table 3 ]
We are now in position to estimate the parameter  (10) and (11) . The estimation is made using the DOLS of Stock and Watson (1993) as previously described. The results of the estimation of this equation for each country, in terms of the coefficient  and the statistic  C , a LM statistic from the DOLS residuals, which tests for deterministic cointegration (i.e., when no _____________________________ 19 For instance , estimated fiscal reaction rules for the US, and concluded for an active fiscal stance in the early to mid-1980s, and through the 2000s, which indirectly hints at the lack of fiscal sustainability. This is rather in line with our results in Table 2 .b, where for the case of the US we cannot reject the hypothesis of the absence of cointegration between government spending and revenues. 20 Our results, as most of the results reported in the literature, were obtained without considering additional sources of government revenues: for instance, seignorage and privatization revenues. Additionally, government assets (wealth) should be taken into account to make judgements about the sustainability of public finances (even though data are mostly lacking).
trend is present in the regression), appear in Table 4 . Two main results can be obtained from Table 4 .a. First, since most of the cointegration statistics are highly significant at usual levels, the null of deterministic cointegration is rejected (less so in the case of the (lagged) debt-primary balance relationship). And, second, the estimates of  are in 15 [ Table 4 .a]
As two robustness checks, we have redone the exercise by: i) allowing for more lags in (10) , that is, this time testing cointegration between the primary balance and the second lagged debt ratio; and ii) testing cointegration between the primary balance and the lagged debt deviation to each country's mean over the entire period. Results (see Table 4 .b) yield positive and statistically significant estimates of  in 9 (7) out of 18 cases for the former (latter) exercise and roughly corresponding to the same set of countries. 21 Therefore, the conclusion that emerges is that we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable for half of the countries in our sample.
[ Table 4 .b]
An additional exercise is to explore the causality direction between total government revenues and expenditures. Table 5 .a present our results for the standard Granger causality test but also the Toda-Yamamoto one. In general, focusing on the former test first, evidence suggests stronger effects running from revenues to expenditures. In Canada, however, two-way causality is found, that is, we have "fiscal synchronization" in line with the assumption of equivalency between the marginal costs and marginal revenues that the utility-maximization suppliers and demanders of the public services make. It seems that in only 6 cases we have causality running from expenditures to revenues (the "spend and tax" hypothesis), meaning that the majority of fiscal authorities are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned expenditures; that is, the authorities have not kept fiscal budgets under control. Similar conclusions result from inspecting the Toda-Yamamoto test with Germany and Netherlands _____________________________ 21 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us explore additional possible channels through which cointegration could be realised.
emerging as the two cases where two-way causality is present, that is, where we have "fiscal synchronization".
[ Table 5a ]
As remarked before, in equilibrium the fiscal solvency condition holds in both the MD and FD regimes and the positive estimates of  found in Table 4 can be found in both of them.
Hence, Table 5 .b presents the results from the standard Granger-causality tests together with the Toda-Yamamoto version, similarly to Table 5 .a. Two-way causality was found in Italy in the former test, and in Japan and the Netherlands in the latter test. For these countries results from causality tests do not allow us to conclude whether fiscal solvency would have followed a MD or FD regime between 1970 and 2010. Granger-causality just from primary balance to debt appears for Finland, Ireland, Spain and the UK. On the other hand, Granger causality from government debt to the primary balance is found for 12 countries, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime.
[ Table 5b ]
Panel Analysis
Tables B1.a and B1.b in Appendix B report the outcome for the full sample of three panel unit root tests: two first generation type, namely IPS and MW and one second generation type, namely CIPS. They show that the null hypothesis of unit roots for the panel data for debt, total government expenditures, revenues and the primary balance cannot be rejected when variables are taken in levels. 22 These results strongly indicate that the variables are non-stationary in level and stationary in first differences (with the exception of the primary balance with first generation panel unit root tests - Table B1 , last column). Table 6 shows the outcomes of Pedroni's (1999) relationships identified in equations (10) and (11) are cointegrated for the panel of all countries in our sample. 23 [ Table 6 ]
We then estimate the cointegrating vector using the FMOLS estimator. Table 7 shows the coefficients obtained with this estimator. The estimated coefficient for the pool of all countries is 0.51 and 0.03 (statistically significant at the 1% level) for the revenues-expenditures and primary balance-debt relationships, respectively. Focusing on the former, as before (Table 4) [ Table 7 ]
Turning to the Pedroni causality tests, one should note first that despite the fact that these tests can be implemented on a country-by-country basis 24 , in practice the reliability of these various point estimates and associated tests for any one country is likely to be poor given the relatively short time sample over which the data are observed. Therefore, our tests will be panel based. In particular, we want to know more about the pervasiveness of a long-run causal effect in the panel rather than simply finding that there is at least some long-run causality present in at least one specific country. To this end, we use both a group mean based test 25 and a lambdaPearson based test 26 . The combination of the group mean and the lambda-Pearson can be particularly informative when the underlying parameters of interest are heterogeneous. For _____________________________ 23 The same is true if instead of the debt-ratio if one computes the same test statistics for the debt-mean deviation. 24 Results are available upon request. 25 The group mean test is based on the sample average of the individual country i 1  tests and will allow us to ask whether the long-run causal effect is zero on average for the panel. The group mean panel estimate is computed as  is zero, even though we reject that it is pervasively zero in the panel. 27 The results for each of these panel tests for the direction of long-run causality and the sign of the long-run causal effect are reported in Table 8 .
[ Table 8 ]
In examining the details of Table 8 reject the hypothesis that primary balances have a zero average long-run effect globally (group mean tests). In other words, there is no long-run causality in this case running from the primary balance to government debt. At the same time, the sign of the effect is mixed, so that the average is still zero. As before, on average the marginal long-run impact is zero.
In order to control additionally for other effects on the a fiscal reaction specification as (10), we have made the estimation using information on financial crisis The rational is that when such crisis occur, the response of primary balances to increases in government indebtedness will tend to be lower, given the additional effort asked to public finances under those circumstances.
Therefore, we use financial crises dummies derived from Leaven and Valencia's (2010) publicly _____________________________ 27 This can occur when the value for i 1  is significantly positive for some fraction of the panel and significantly negative for another fraction of the panel. In this case, we can say that a long-run causal effect is present, even if for some members of the panel it is positive while for others it is negative. available database, and use them both in an additive and multiplicative (with the debt variable) in a pooled estimation of (1).
[ Table 9 ]
The results in Table 9 show that financial crisis negatively impinge on the primary balance, as expected, and this is a consistently statistically significant result. For instance, in the case of the multiplicative dummy, the overall reaction of the primary balance to government debt developments may even be reversed, undermining fiscal sustainability. 28 
Conclusion
In this paper we have revisited the issue of fiscal policy sustainability in a sample of 18 suggesting that the solvency condition would not be satisfied. We find similar results in the cases of total government expenditures, total government revenues and the primary balance series, with the non-rejection of the null of unit root (in levels) for most countries.
Moreover, evidence suggests the existence of one cointegrating relationship in only 6 countries between revenues and expenditures. However, the overall test results allow the rejection of the cointegration hypothesis in both relationships under scrutiny. In other words, for the period 1970-2010, government expenditures, in half of the countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than public revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability.
Estimating the cointegrating coefficient we get 15 out of 18 cases positive and statistically significant estimates for the revenues-expenditures relationship and these are always less than one, that is, for each percentage point of GDP increase in public expenditures, revenues increase by less than one percentage point of GDP.
In terms of individual-country causality, evidence suggests stronger effects running from revenues to expenditures. Moreover in only 6 cases we have causality running from expenditures to revenues (the "spend and tax" hypothesis), meaning that the majority of fiscal authorities are not able to generate the revenues required to finance the planned expenditures.
_____________________________ 28 For instance, in column (3) in Table 9 , we have: / 0.014 0.049
, implying an effect of -0.035 when a financial crisis takes place.
On the other hand, Granger causality from government debt to the primary balance is found for 12 countries, which can be seen as evidence of the existence of a Ricardian regime.
Our panel data results corroborate time-series findings with the greatest share of empirical evidence pointing to a positive long-run co-movement between the levels of total government revenues and expenditures, that is, changes in revenues appear to induce permanent changes in long-run expenditures.
Even tough we find that long-run causality seems to run from lagged debt to the primary balance, on average the marginal long-run impact is zero. All in all, we cannot say that fiscal policy has been sustainable for many countries in our sample. Notes: The regression equations correspond to (10) and (11) as discussed in the main text. t-stat. stands for t-statistics. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.  , which reflects the presence or absence of long-run causality running from revenues to expenditures. Finally, the last column reports the group median point estimate of the sign ratio in the first row, with the simulated standard error reported in parenthesis in the second row. Note: Pooled OLS estimation of Eq.(10) using as regressor either lagged debt or lagged debt-mean deviation together with additive or multiplicative dummy for financial crises (FC). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. . *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels.
